The American Association for the Surgery of Trauma has proposed that the specialty of trauma and critical care include emergency surgery. We assessed whether this change will have an impact on the financial challenges that this specialty confronts, including inadequate reimbursement for efforts exerted. Methods: Over a 2-year period, we collected financial data on 6 trauma and critical care surgeons. Three included emergency surgery as part of their practice, but no private elective component. The other 3 included both emergency surgery and a private elective component. Results: Trauma and critical care surgeons who had included emergency surgery but no private elective component had significantly lower charges ($5,941,482 vs $9,209,535), collections ($1,439,913 vs $2,973,319), generated relative value units (50,440 vs 80,327), generated reimbursement per relative value units ($28.55 vs $37.02), and margins ($0.20 vs $1.48) than their counterparts who had an elective surgery component.
A n early warning of an impending crisis in the specialty of trauma and critical care was the publication of a resident survey by Richardson and Miller in 1992. 1 Since this seminal paper, there has been an awakening among trauma and critical care surgeons and their representative societies that the specialty is in danger of extinction as a result of the inability to attract young, bright, and dedicated individuals into its fold. [2] [3] [4] [5] The disaffection with the specialty includes its negative impact on personal lifestyle, its decreasing operative caseload, the unsavory group of patients cared for, the high disease risk, the high burnout risk, the increased medicallegal risk, and the inadequate reimbursement for the amount of work exerted and stress involved. [5] [6] [7] [8] As a result of these pressures, in 2002, the American Association for the Surgery of Trauma (AAST), under the leadership of Ronald Maier, initiated a process to redefine the specialties boundary and work process. 9 This effort culminated in 2004 with a proposal by the Association's Future of Trauma Committee redefining the specialty's boundary and recommending that the specialty petition, in a collaborative effort with other trauma and critical care societies, for advisory council status at the American Board of Surgery. 10 Under the leadership of the AAST, the proposal outlined that the specialty of "trauma and critical care surgery" evolve into the specialty of "acute care surgery: trauma, emergency surgery, and surgical critical care." The boundary of "emergency surgery" would include emergency general surgery, along with emergency vascular, thoracic, orthopaedic, and neurologic surgery. Currently, the Association's Future of Trauma Committee is refining and standardizing a curriculum for training. Furthermore, in the winter of 2005, the Association was working collaboratively with the American Burn Association, the American College Surgeons Committee on Trauma, and the Society of Critical Care Medicine Surgical Section, successfully petitioning the American Board of Surgery for advisory council status. 11, 12 The overarching goals of these changes are to best serve the needs of patients, enhance operative experience, offer an attractive and sustainable career and lifestyle, and have the specialty become better recognized by the public and the profession be viewed as valuable. Our current study was undertaken to assess whether the addition of the specialty of emergency surgery will have a meaningful impact on the financial challenge that the specialty of trauma and critical care surgery has encountered, and whether the new specialty of acute care surgery: trauma, emergency surgery, and surgical critical care will need to deal with inadequate reimbursement for efforts exerted.
METHODS
Over a 24-month period (January 2002 to December 2003), we prospectively collected financial data from our practice group accounting system on 6 full-time faculty members. All 6 faculty members were board-certified general surgeons with special qualifications in surgical critical care and who participated in trauma care at a level I trauma center verified by the American College of Surgeons Committee on Trauma. They practiced in an urban medical center that included a university hospital that is a verified level I trauma center and 2 other large private healthcare systems. The university hospital, the 2 private healthcare systems, and local and state government did not reimburse the physicians for uninsured and unfunded patient care.
For comparison, faculty members were categorized into 2 groups. Group I consisted of 3 of the faculty members who were trauma and critical care surgeons, who included emergency surgery as part of their work effort, but who chose to do no private elective practice. The emergency surgical practice included emergency general surgery as well as emergent vascular and thoracic surgery, and upper and lower gastrointestinal endoscopy. Group II consisted of 3 trauma and critical care surgeons who had a similar emergency surgery practice as well as a private elective practice as part of their work effort; these practices include thoracic, vascular, and laparoscopic surgery as well as other complex tertiary referral cases.
Data collected included payor source, charges, reimbursement, total relative value units generated, source of relative value unit generated (ie, trauma, critical care, emergency surgery, elective surgery), and physician cost. Physician cost included not only corporate overhead (ie, rent for space, personnel, and associated benefits, cost of billing and collection, malpractice, office and medical supplies, miscellaneous), but also academic program support (dean, departmental and divisional academic taxation). To assess the value of a generated relative value unit, a reimbursement to relative value unit ratio was calculated. To assess a profit margin, a reimbursement to physician cost ratio was calculated. Both groups I and II have identical compensation contracts.
Student t test was used for statistical analysis. A P value of Ͻ0.05 was considered significant. This study was approved by the University of Louisville School of Medicine Human Investigational Review Board. Table 1 compares financial data for each of the 2 12-month periods for the 3 trauma and critical care surgeons who included emergency surgery as part of their work effort but no private elective practice (group I). This analysis demonstrates that over the 2 12-month periods, the number of generated relative value units for patients with commercial insurance decreased by 30%, but the number of government insured and uninsured and unfunded patients increased by 8% and 30%, respectively. This shift in payor source was also accompanied by a 4% reduction in work volume or generated relative value units. Yet, the distribution of the relative value units remained the same (52% vs 50% in trauma care, 30% vs 30% in surgical critical care, 18% vs 20% in emergency surgery). This combined effect of an increase in uninsured and unfunded patients with a reduction in work volume led to a downstream reduction in charges by $138,504 (5%), reimbursement by $206,451 (25%), in the value of a relative value unit by $7.14 (22%), and profit margin as defined by the reimbursement per cost ratio by $0.37 (25%).
RESULTS
These findings suggest that trauma, emergency surgery, and surgical critical care surgeons who have no private elective component and practice in an urban teaching institution that provides no methodology to reimburse physicians for uninsured and unfunded medical care place themselves in a perilous economic situation. To maintain financial solvency, they are dependent on 3 factors that they cannot control: work volume (the level of clinical activity in trauma, emergency surgery, and surgical critical care), a high reimbursement for generated relative value unit from government and commercial insurers, and the attraction of a financially viable payor mix. As a result of this lack of financial control and the lack of an elective private practice, they cannot buffer their practice from external fluctuations or crosssubsidize their primary work in trauma, emergency surgery, and surgical critical care. Although currently breaking "about even," these 3 trauma surgeons could soon require subsidy from faculty colleagues or accept modest reductions in personal income. Table 2 compares the financial data for each of the 2 12-month periods for the 3 trauma and critical care surgeons with a similar emergency surgery practice as well as a private elective practice as part of their work effort (group II). This analysis demonstrates that over the 2 12-month periods, there was an increase in relative value units generated for government and commercially insured patients as well as uninsured and unfunded patients by 14%, 11%, and 11%, respectively. This increase in government and commercially insured patients was all from the private elective practice. This shift in payor source was also accompanied by a 12% increase in generated relative value, again, all generated from the elective private practice. Of interest, the distribution of the relative value units remained similar (33% vs 33% in trauma care, 23% vs 23% in surgical critical care, 18% vs 17% in emergency surgery, and 26% vs 27% in the private elective component). This combined effect, an increase in insured patients and workload, led to a downstream increase in charges by $739,129 (18%) and in reimbursement by $37,661 (3%). Yet, the value of a generated relative value unit decreased by $3.19 (8%), reflecting the effect of reimbursement reductions for work efforts exerted by both government and commercial payors. Although the value of a generated relative value unit decreased, the profit margin as measured by the reimbursement per cost ratio was maintained and slightly increased by $0.06 (2%). These findings reflect the ability of an increase in work volume within a financially viable payor mix to overcome a reduction in the value of a relative value unit. Trauma, emergency surgery, and surgical critical care surgeons who practice in an urban teaching institution with no physician funding for the uninsured and unfunded medical care, who develop a private elective component, can withstand a reduction in trauma, emergency surgery, and surgical critical care workload, a reduction in the value of a relative value unit, and an increase in uninsured and unfunded payor mix. This can be accomplished by increasing their private practice work efforts or improving their private practice payor mix. They can financially buffer their practice from external forces and crosssubsidize their trauma, emergency surgery, and surgical critical care practice. Table 3 compares the financial data over the total 24-month period between the 2 groups. Analysis of payor source by relative value units generated demonstrates that group I cared for significantly fewer government and commercially insured patients as well as a significantly greater number of uninsured and unfunded patients. They also generated significantly fewer charges (55%), fewer collections (107%), fewer relative value units (59%), and their distribution of relative value units was geared to trauma and surgical critical care. Furthermore, the reimbursed value of a relative value unit was significantly lower (by $8.47 or 30%) and profit margin as measured by the reimbursement per cost ratio was significantly less (by $1.28 or 106%).
DISCUSSION
We demonstrate that the addition of the emergency surgery specialty did not improve the financial viability of trauma and surgical critical care. In fact, as uncontrollable external factors fluctuate such as the number of insured and uninsured and unfunded patients, level of workload, and the value of a relative value unit, financial viability is more threatened. This report also documents the precarious financial state of trauma and surgical critical care as a specialty at urban teaching institutions with their traditional underinsured and unfunded patient base, the continuous downward pressure on the value of a relative value unit, and the unpredictable workload.
A significant hospital or governmental effort is needed to incorporate changes in work processes that will allow the specialty to survive not only professionally, but also financially. In view of this reality, the specialty must turn to alternatives. There are several. Direct significant subsidy from the hospital is a plausible, if unlikely, solution. Development of a consistent source of funding that remediates the present inadequate reimbursement for work effort is another solution. The difficulty in implementing these solutions is the source of the funding in an era of retrenchment by hospitals, federal and local government, as well as commercial insurers. Simply stated, none of the players in the sandbox is willing to give up their "jacks." They continue to force the trauma, emergency surgery, and surgical critical care surgeon to assume all of the financial risk.
An economic alternative would be to reduce the cost of business to maintain a survival margin. This could be accomplished with a retrenchment policy specifically targeted at restricting access to or denying medical care to uninsured and unfunded patients or poor third party payors. This economic solution would create a crisis. Yet, it would eventually falter and exacerbate the present hostile environment between patients and physicians and create an untenable ethical situation. The most radical solution is to continue to do nothing and let the specialty die on the vine.
In our opinion, the most plausible economic alternative is documented in our report. It is the development of a substantial private practice that crosssubsidizes the practice of trauma, emergency surgery, and surgical critical care is more financially viable in urban teaching institutions than the addition of emergency surgery. This alternative strategy can withstand reductions in workload, the continuous and ongoing downward pressure on the value of a relative value unit, and an increase in uninsured and unfunded medical care. This is accomplished by increasing the private practice work effort while maintaining or improving a favorable private practice payor mix. This alternative strategy can buffer the trauma, emergency surgery, and surgical critical care specialist in an urban teaching institution from external financial forces that continue the vicious cycle that we find ourselves in todayinadequate reimbursement for effort exerted. Anytime one suggests economic alternatives, one should also evaluate the downside. The economic alternative based on this report definitely has a negative impact on personal lifestyle and work effort; one does work harder, it does increase oncall time, and occasionally, it interferes with the elective surgical schedule. Furthermore, it may only be a viable economic alternative as long as reimbursement per relative value unit generated in the private elective practice provides a viable margin. Therefore, the economic alternative suggested in this report may increase the disaffection with the specialty. Yet, at the same time, it addresses many of the significant issues that have been documented by many of the published reports on the subject. It increases operative caseload and keeps surgical skills at a higher level than presently provided by the specialty. It allows the trauma, emergency surgery, and surgical critical care surgeon to care for a more savory group of patients. It may reduce the risk of burnout by providing surgical variety and other patient care focus. It could positively impact the specialty's current negative role model and attract young, bright, and dedicated individuals into the fold. It offers an attractive and financially sustainable career and lifestyle with modest compensation increases for the extra work. It potentially may allow the specialty to be better recognized by the public and as a valuable profession. It would crossfertilize other fields of surgical practice with surgical critical care knowledge. Lastly, it would address the issue of inadequate reimbursement for the amount of work exerted and stress involved.
If these trends continue, all of our trauma surgeons may have to join the group II model. Other "nontrauma" faculty surgeons who work privately at a university hospital to be financially viable also have a major private elective surgery practice there, primarily in digestive and oncologic surgery.
Like in any clinical study, this study has flaws. It is a single-institutional study that may reflect our regional and individual bias. The situation in our urban surgical practice may not reflect the situation in other parts of the country. Lastly, solutions offered may work for us but not for others.
In conclusion, the addition of the specialty of emergency surgery did not alter the financial dilemma confronting trauma and surgical critical care as a specialty. In fact, as external financial forces fluctuate, financial viability is more threatened. Without significantly increased hospital or government financial support, the most viable financial option for trauma, critical care, and emergency surgery surgeons is to develop a substantial private practice component that will crosssubsidize the practice. As the AAST incorporates changes in work processes that will allow the specialty to survive professionally, it must also develop and support alternatives that allow the specialty to survive financially.
Discussions
DR. RICHARD L. GAMELLI (MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS): Dr. Rodriguez has raised a critically important subject as we look to the reorientation of the subspecialty of trauma and critical care. I think he has properly cautioned in his manuscript that this represents a single center analysis, which is vitally important for all of us to understand. Additionally, it is a strategy that has worked in one locale.
Dr. Rodriguez, the questions that I would have for you are: 1. Three of you were successful, 3 of you were not. Why haven't the other 3 adopted the strategy of the successful "greyhounds"? 2. Simply placing surgeons at an outside institution is no guarantee that they will develop a successful private practice. In our own circumstance with multiple remote practice sites, placing general surgeons not part of a multi-disciplinary program or without a unique set of skills has not necessarily been successful strategy. Have you engaged in a market analysis to determine the skill sets are needed when you or one of your partners goes to an area to ensure this will be a successful investment of time? 3. Are we suggesting then that someone will need to be trained in general surgery, have qualifications in critical care and trauma and something else? 4. Have you gone into these markets with very unique skills such as bariatric surgery, which can be a successful opportunity in a remote site? 5. If a trauma and critical care surgeon attempted to supplement their income as breast surgeon, an additional 4000 RVUs would take a significant amount of effort to achieve and not be particularly profitable. Therefore, it would seem the area of subspecialty practice must also be considered. 6. In your analysis did you determine if charge capture and net collections at 1 year were equivalent across both groups of surgeons? 7. For the group that was not successful have you done a posthoc analysis comparing university patient payments with that of the private practice patients to determine if there are differences in the revenue cycle? So while this is important strategy, it requires each institution to come up with its own unique strategy and a thoughtful analysis of the faculty. If this is not properly done moving into a competitive marketplace attempting to establish a broad based general surgical practice is not likely to overly rewarding.
DR. JORGE L. RODRIGUEZ (LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY): I think in the discussion you picked up a very important point, that there has to be a strategy and that this strategy can actually fail if that general surgeon, whoever's secondary specialty he has, is not absorbed into the community and is not productive. We have done multiple charge ad hoc analyses looking at what the issue is. And the real issue is the unfunded, uninsured patient who has no revenue. We looked at a 4-year spread in these individuals and in the whole practice group. For every 100,000 RVUs that we generated over 4 years it affected our reimbursement of commercial and governmental payers by 8% and affected the bottom line by 25%. So the issue is not a charge capture or not getting the bills out on time, it is taking care of patients who have an unfunded and uninsured medical care need and the financial process.
I do agree with you, the second question is you have to have some specialty training or at least know the marketplaces that are available to you to be able to expand your trauma critical care surgeons into. In our practice group we have bariatric surgeons, thoracic cardiovascular surgeons, and vascular surgeons who participate in trauma care. The reason the other individuals probably do not participate in that level of experience is because they don't have that as extra training besides being trained in trauma and critical care. I think it is important as we develop new Fellowships that we get those avenues to those individuals to be able to develop another process besides trauma and critical care.
DR. CHARLES E. LUCAS (DETROIT, MICHIGAN):
The message delivered by Dr. Rodriguez is very important for our survival. More than 55 years ago, Dr. Charley Johnston instituted a policy whereby all attending surgeons would supervise, in-house, all emergency or trauma operations done at the Detroit Receiving Hospital. They would also supervise, in-house, all of the elected surgery and they were involved in the private practice of surgery.
One of the things learned from this policy is that the only way that you can be competent in the care of compli-cated injuries is to have the skills obtained by dealing with these organs in other situations.
One really doesn't want to have a patient have resection for a bad liver injury by a trauma surgeon who seldom treats liver injury and is not doing elective hepatectomies for tumor. Our survival depends not only financially but for good patient care on following the recommendations that Dr. Rodriguez has just given us.
DR. JORGE L. RODRIGUEZ (LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY): I think what Dr. Lucas brings up is an important point that we bring out in the discussion. There are 2 advantages to having trauma critical care surgeons develop a second specialty, which is, they can cross-fertilize the other specialties with critical care knowledge; and the second thing, it does keep a high level of practical functional techniques for surgeons. Instead of just being trauma critical care, they are able to practice those in another specialty.
DR. NANCY L. ASCHER (SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA): I think maybe I am confused about something. The advantage to using the RVUs is that it enables us to determine the amount of work an individual is regardless of payor mix. It doesn't so much address the return on the RVU. But I am concerned that perhaps your data reflects a bias in how uninsured versus insured patients are managed. Can you comment on that?
DR. JORGE L. RODRIGUEZ (LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY): I think RVUs do more than just tell us how much work effort we do. You can actually generate multiple RVU ratios that tell you not only how much work effort you perform but what is your third-party payer paying you for that work effort you do. And I think that is an important assessment of the RVU. I think the RVUs could be taken a little bit further, and if you do a good financial analysis you can actually figure out what your third party payer is paying you instead of use something antiquated processes like 130% of Medicare cost schedules. What you really want to know is, what are you paying me for the work that I am doing? And the advantage of the RVU is to be able to assess that process and put that together.
In the unfunded or insured unfunded care, there is no difference in the care that we provide. What we are providing is the same care and the same cost structure. What you will see-this is not the hospital analysis but this is actually the practice group analysis. In the hospital analysis you may be able to provide that data and look at the cost structure. But the cost structure is very similar in the practice with regards to do we take care of an indigent patient or insured patient. It may be different at the hospital level if they want to restrict drugs or labs to reduce the costs of taking care of unfunded patients. We certainly don't do that. surgical training changes, who is going to be performing not only management of the trauma patient but the acute surgical or emergent surgical patient?
There is going to be people who have comprehensive general surgical skills practicing in many places throughout the country, not just in the big academic centers. We get so involved with our own institutions we think that is where it all has to happen, when, in fact, the great majority of surgery is done in nonteaching hospitals.
So we have to figure out how we are going to do that. Because if we train people only to do trauma and acute surgery, how many will there be, and how long are they going to do it? Where is their career going to go? Are they going to still take trauma call at 65 to 70 or not?
The second big issue is, if we start training people in different specialties where there are certain subspecialties that have no call responsibilities because all acute surgery is done by somebody else, then it is going to be very hard to take residents who come through and look at this and they say, "Call every fifth night or sixth night in-house or no call. What am I going to do?" We have very smart residents, it is not going to be too hard for them to figure out which one they are going to pick.
So I think as we try again to identify the paradigm of how we are going to train people in the future, we have to take those factors into account in the long term, not only in the scope of surgery in this country and beyond now, but in terms of the next generation or two down the line. To my read you are really comparing 2 different groups of surgeons, one who does an average of 8000 work RVUs a year and another group who is doing an average of 13,000 work RVUs a year, 1 group practicing in the hospital with a very unfavorable payer mix and another group working at that hospital and other hospitals with a preferential payer mix. So is this really a function of both workload and payer mix?
The addition of emergency general surgery to our program actually helped improve the bottom line of trauma and critical care because the payer mix of our emergency general surgery patients is actually better than the trauma patients.
So I think, as Dr. Kaiser pointed out yesterday, not all work is the same and not all RVUs are the same. So have you been able to use this data to support those people who are dedicating their efforts full time to taking care of those unfunded patients?
DR. JORGE L. RODRIGUEZ (LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY): We have a long discussion of that in the manuscript. Unfortunately, when you get into a situation you have to develop alternatives. And we have several alternatives that are available to us. We can essentially stop taking care of unfunded and uninsured patients and not provide that care. And that will create a significant ethical issue for us and will create a really poor relationship with the patients. I don't think that is a very good option. The other option is that you need to do something, because if not, you are going to die on the vine.
Exactly what you describe is exactly what has happened to trauma and critical care over the last 15 years. It has been practiced in urban academic health care centers, especially in urban academic health care centers, where the payer mix is very, very poor. So as we look at alternatives, this is an alternative that I think we need to look at.
Essentially what you describe is correct. If you are a trauma surgeon and use trauma and critical care in an urban academic health care center, you are going to generate about 8000 RVUs a year, which about 45% of the RVU are generated in unfunded and uninsured patients and there will be no reimbursement. If you look at the data for 2003 for the group 1 physicians you will see that the RVU per cost was $1.03. That means for every dollar we spent we got a 3 cents profit margin. You can't maintain that financially survivable. So I think what we are describing is the issue that we are at now, and we are providing another alternative.
I have taken this data to the hospital administrator, and generated an RVU-generated process for imaging care. The cost to that hospital, you just can't do it for the Department of Surgery, you have to do it for everybody involved in the process, is about $5 million. And right now they don't see how they are going to be able to fund that. Because the profit margin is very slim. In our institution, it will take about $5 million to cover all the RVUs generated if you cross-mix all your RVUs from your private practice and give them a number about of $35.55 for every RVU you generate.
So we have done that. You can take that along. But it takes a long time for the system. Remember, we are in a sandbox and people are taking their jacks out and they are not giving any to us. So that is a significant issue.
DR. JEAN C. EMOND (NEW YORK, NEW YORK): In the New York practice environment there is very much an enormous disparity between public and private reimbursement. The more famous or experienced surgeons attract patients who pay cash. Some of them stopped taking any insurance. It creates, if you will, a redistribution of wealth that can support the young surgeons. But the casualty can be the academic mission.
Both trauma and critical care are incredibly rich venues for clinical research, trauma remains probably the biggest health issue in the country and critical care should be a laboratory for novel therapy. So in your conclusion slideyou could either choose private practice to subsidize this trauma surgeons else find a more appropriate reimbursement scheme. And I would encourage you to keep fighting to get these costs correctly paid for. Otherwise, the academic mission is gone.
Rodriguez and Polk
Annals of Surgery • Volume 242, Number 4, October 2005 DR. JORGE L. RODRIGUEZ (LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY): We are an academic department. We do academics, we write papers, we write grants. I think you need to continue to do that. That is part of the process. That is why we are in this business. So from that process I think you need to look at the venues to financially survive. But academics should also be part of the process.
DR. WILLIAM P. SCHECTER (SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA): I have noticed in my life that people tend to go where the money is. For those of us who work in underfunded public institutions, this solution would take people out of public institutions where we are all spending 150% of our time and put us in other institutions in order to make money. I agree with that Dr. Emond's comments that we would be removing faculty from our public institutions. It would take away from teaching, which is already under great stress, and academics.
My own view is we are like the police department and the fire department. The body politic has to decide whether they want 24-hour, seven day a week care for underfunded patients. Our system is falling apart. When they realize it, they will either let the process continue or they will fund it like they do the police department and the fire department.
